jomini decisive point

Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point. Jomini distinguished between mountain crossing and fighting in “mountainous provinces”, opining that the latter was a much more difficult matter. I think Jomini is again correct here, although Clausewitz does a better job of explaining the nature and origins of strategic objectives starting with his “War is the continuation of policy by other means” maxim. The current 6 After establishing the theories and principles behind naval concentration, Mahan followed Jomini 's prescribed outline and examined how one maintains a fleet in a theater of operations. He believed it to be generally a waste of time. Jomini thought in more practical, concrete terms. In fact, if the art of war consist in directing one's forces upon the decisive point, it is comprehended that the first means of applying this principle will be to take the initiative of movements. 0000002392 00000 n Implicitly, the decisive point is where the mass of an army will have the greatest effect. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at … Antoine Henri Jomini Under all his theories on the subject lies the fundamental principle which defined in the below four maxims (Chapter 3: Section: THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WA (1) To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without … Jomini considered the attack stronger than the defense. Clausewitz’s idea that offensive military power is a consumable resource, which comes from this line of thinking, is also I think his most underrated insight. On very close examination, I think the two writers are not totally at odds, because Jomini’s emphasis of an attack is based on “all things being equal”, but they are not. Clausewitz is right, and he’s right for the right reasons as well: an attacker experiences more friction than a defender. They were said to have marched off to war with “ sword in one hand and their copy of Jomini in the other.” 0000000735 00000 n The first, which I want to get out of the way, is that they both think that Dietrich von Bulow is an idiot. 0000002129 00000 n For Clausewitz, interior lines are an indicator of the natural advantage of the defense. In fact I think it likely that the impetus for both thinkers was at least partly that they figured they could do a better job of military theory than von Bulow. Clausewitz thought of centers of gravity in terms of effects on the enemy, and more specifically as a way to “unravel” an adversary at the most basic level and defeat him totally. #Mean #Work Out #Troops 0000006138 00000 n 4. Jomini took the consequentialist position that whatever achieves your objectives most efficiently is best, and that if a commander can accomplish this without a set piece battle, then all well and good. Jomini defined strategy as the “art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion” (11). In fact, this distinction serves as a pretty good example of the differences between the two men. His magnum opus elaborates on these principles and their application, often applying geometric concepts and terms to … 0000009743 00000 n %%EOF decisive point A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an … To Jomini, victory could be achieved by adhering to a fundamental principle of war: the application of mass against an enemy at a decisive point at the proper time. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed…[i]n small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Clausewitz famously believed in the importance of the Decisive Battle, calling other forms of military action “small change”. The Center of Gravity vs The Decisive Point. 0000010902 00000 n startxref He provided early definitions for modern concepts such as the "theater of operation" and the "COMMZ." At bottom, the general's task was always the same: to concentrate superior forces at what Jomini called "the decisive point," a point that was defined by the interactive decisions of the opposing commanders themselves. ... the decisive point with considerable power.Jomini viewed war as an excellent drama for military geniuses and heroes to combine talents and transcend the mundan. -- Antoine-Henri Jomini . Jomini’s core principles include offensive, rather than defensive, action, as well as massing forces at a decisive point of attack to gain local superiority. The ingredients of operational design are decisive points, centers of gravity, and culmination. 0000011540 00000 n Jomini was born on March 6, 1779, in the town of Payerne, located in the Swiss canton of Vaud. Unable to afford a commission in the Swiss Watteville regiment then under the command of the French, at age 14 he was … In the famous theoretical Chapter 25 of the Traité de grande tactique, he stressed the exclusive superiority of interior lines. I suspect Clausewitz has only become more correct as weapons have become more lethal, which allow errors caused by friction to have more severe consequences. Clausewitz was seeking what was different. Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was a Swiss soldier and leading military theorist, whose classical ideas influenced all military strategists and military historians of the 19th and 20th century. Each ingredient relates to one another in the context of operational design. Here we see an offensive approach to taking out the enemy using a concentric striking concept, hit the mass in … Interior lines 4. For Jomini, war was a scientific enterprise best understood on scientific principles. Jomini believed that the key to the conduct of the operational art in war could be reduced to four maxims. and JP 5-0 (Joint Planning) on the other hand defines the “center of gravity” as. Jomini referred to the regions as decisive points. Primacy of the offense 5. Jomini acknowledges it, but considers it a separate but connected sphere of activity. Jomini specifically admires the exploits of the Cossacks in Russian service — having seen them from both ends by the time he wrote The Art of War — and uses them several times as an example of fighting forces with distinct if not unique characteristics. The key to victory was offensive action to combine superior forces against weaker enemy forces at a decisive point. 3. Jomini never quite gives an exact definition of a “decisive point”, but he still makes it pretty clear what he’s talking about. Clausewitz is simply wrong about this, and I believe the difference in opinion between the two men results from their personal experience; Jomini had much more access to the inner circles of commanding generals and military establishments than did his rival. Clausewitz is more of a philosopher and writes to distill warfare to its most fundamental concepts, often getting important concepts wrong — though when he’s wrong, he’s wrong in interesting ways. Aside from trivialities like “numerical superiority is better, ceteris paribus”, Clausewitz and Jomini agree on several concepts. Clausewitz’s conception of war as a dialectical process between escalation and restraining forces has no parallel in Jomini’s writing. Clausewitz likewise, and wrongly, downplayed the importance of military deception. Because of these problems, it has taken on different meanings. Jomini's military writings are easy to unfairly caricature: they were characterized by a highly didactic and prescriptive approach, conveyed in an extensive geometric vocabulary of strategic lines, bases, and key points. Jomini’s core principles include offensive, rather than defensive, action, as well as massing forces at a decisive point of attack to gain local superiority. either terrain or enemy focused. Maneuver ii. 0000003879 00000 n Clausewitz believed that the defense was no only stronger, but that this was true on a fundamental level and further that defense (resistance to invasion) was the most basic form of war. Jomini began his military career in 1798 at the age of nineteen, when he used personal connections to gain em ployment as secretary to the minister of war of the newly established Helvetic Republic. Jomini's military writings are frequently analyzed: he took a didactic, prescriptive approach, reflected in a detailed vocabulary of geometric terms such as bases, strategic lines, and key points. Jomini let this post in 1801 and spent the next three years working in the Paris inancial markets. They agree about the importance of interior lines, although with slightly different reasoning. In this manner the commander could aggressively engage fractions of the the decisive point; expressed in the homely phrase of getting there first with the most men. Jomini also had the belief that “attacks should be conducted against weak points in enemy formations and fortifications” and “identify the decisive point and strike” [7]. As a child he was fascinated by soldiers and the art of war and was eager to attend the Prince de Wurtemberg's military academy in Montbelliard, but his family's circumstances did not permit this. In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point with the base … —Jomini iii. 0 the French were more excitable than the Prussians), and that this is reflected in substantial differences in the composition and doctrine of different armies. 0000005078 00000 n The key, according to Jomini, was to identify the "decisive point" and strike. Likewise, Clausewitz thinks more deeply about the political nature of war. For Jomini, they are a matter of geometry which can accrue to either the attack or the defense. Joint doctrine as well as the doctrine of other military services and the former Soviet Union were reviewed to determine the validity of the concept outside the Army. Unable to afford a commission in the Swiss Watteville regiment then under the command of the French, at age 14 he was … Both writers thought deeply about the challenges of crossing and fighting in mountains — this was perhaps the “urban warfare” of the day. As a child he was fascinated by soldiers and the art of war and was eager to attend the Prince de Wurtemberg's military academy in Montbelliard, but his family's circumstances did not permit this. His major corollary: the use of interior lines allows an army to outperform its … They came to pretty much the same conclusions: mountain passes favored the defender and open-order fighting, but given sufficient manpower any pass could be forced — the defensive advantage of mountainous terrain was no absolute, and could tempt the defender into overextension. The decisive point of a field of battle is determined as we have already said: by the configuration of the ground, by the combination of the localities with the strategic end that any army proposes to itself, finally, by the position of the respective forces. 0000008891 00000 n Jomini is not a “sea power theorist” — he thinks of navies exclusively in terms of their ability to transport armies from one place to another, and keep them supplied — but he at least concerns himself with how a maritime power can use its naval forces to its advantage in continental warfare, the British being very much the exemplars. Thinking about the defense of mountain ranges and rivers led both writers to similar conclusions about the ineffectiveness of “cordon warfare”, or trying to defend a long continuous frontier or linear obstacle. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. In the famous theoretical Chapter 25 of the Traité de grande tactique, he stressed the exclusive superiority of interior lines. The graphic, and the definitions above, certainly imply a good deal of overlap between the two concepts. Jomini prescribes maneuvering the mass of an army so as to threaten the “decisive points” in a theater of war and thenr to hurl all available forces against a fraction of … Two tactical level operations, the 1st Marine Division To do that, the leadership of the army had to adapt the element of surprise. 0000001924 00000 n It will often be necessary to attack several lesser centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities simultaneously or in sequence to have the desired effect.

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